We study repeated interactions among a …xed set of "low rationality" players. Each player has a status quo action. Occasionally, he randomly samples other actions and changes his status quo if the sampled action yields a higher payo¤. This behavior generates a random process, the better-reply dynamics.
Introduction
In many situations people do not strategize, even though they are aware of interacting with others, but instead follow simple decision rules that react to the environment.
Consider, for example, an individual who is a "player" in several di¤erent "games" at any given time. These games can vary greatly in their importance to the player and in the information he has. People often don't know others' payo¤s; they may not know the exact nature of their strategic interactions with others; they may not know how smart other players are; and they may not know how many other players there are. Acquiring such information may be possible, but it is rarely costless due to limitations to a player's intelligence, computational ability, and memory. As a result, a player may not fully understand or …nd it worthwhile to devote full attention to some of the games he plays; that is, in some games he may choose "not to play games".
While fully rational behavior is a well understood paradigm, with precise modeling rules, a uni…ed and general approach to modeling bounded rationality has not emerged. Evolutionary models, adaptive behavior, myopic but otherwise rational behavior, have all been studied extensively in recent years and have helped increase our understanding of human behavior, but none of them is immune to criticism. 1 Experimental research in economics and psychology lends support to the belief that people do not always act in accordance with the full rationality paradigm. One of the strongest regularities from experimental studies is that actions that were successful in the past tend to be repeated in the future (e.g., see Roth and Erev [19] ). In this paper we study one of the simplest and least sophisticated stimulus-response models of this kind, in which players follow a naive, gradient based decision rule that allows 1 For an overview of the evolutionary game literature the interested reader should consult the surveys by Weibull [24] , Samuelson [20] , Vega-Redondo [21] , and Young [26] . Examples of papers that focus on Bayesian or intelligently adaptive learning are Jordan [8] and [9] , Blume and Easley [2] , Kalai and Lehrer [10] , Milgrom and Roberts [15] , Fudenberg and Kreps [6] , and Ellison and Fudenberg [4] ; two useful overviews of this literature are Fudenberg and Levine [7] , and Marimon [12] .
for occasional sampling.
In our model, a …xed set of players repeatedly interact; each habitually chooses a particular strategy (the status quo action) and associates with it the payo¤ resulting from the players' status quo action pro…le. Occasionally a player samples another strategy, compares the two payo¤s, and switches his status quo action if the sampled strategy yields a higher payo¤. The behavior of our players generates a stochastic process that moves in the direction of better replies, the better-reply dynamics. Such a process need not be ergodic; however, if a small probability of mistakes is introduced, it is ergodic.
The better-reply dynamics, permitting no more than one player at a time to sample and without the possibility of mistakes, converges to a Nash equilibrium in any …nite game having the property that from any action pro…le there is a …nite sequence of single-player improvements leading to a Nash equilibrium (games having the weak …nite improvement property). Such games include dominance solvable games, quasiacyclic games (similar to acyclic games as de…ned by Young [25] ), and games with the …nite improvement property (as de…ned by Monderer and Shapley [16] ). We show that …nite, supermodular games and generic, continuous, two-player, quasi-concave games also have the weak …nite improvement property (in brief, weak FIP). 2 In …nite games lacking the weak FIP, play need not converge to a Nash equilibrium. We present an example in which a strictly dominated strategy survives, and an example in which play converges to a set of action pro…les that does not include the support of the unique, mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the game.
There are important di¤erences between best-reply and better-reply dynamics. On the one hand, in any game strictly dominated strategies are always eliminated by the best-reply dynamics, but they need not be eliminated by the better-reply dynamics.
On the other hand, the best-reply dynamics need not converge to a Nash equilibrium in games with the weak FIP, but the better-reply dynamics always converges to a 2 In fact, we prove the stronger result that supermodular games are quasi-acyclic.
Nash equilibrium in such games.
In contrast to most other models of boundedly rational behavior, our players make no attempts at forecasting either aggregate or individual behavior, and thus need little information or memory capacity. In fact, our players need not even know their own payo¤ functions; they must merely know the payo¤ they receive from the particular action they currently choose. Thus, the bound on players' rationality is more stringent in our paper than in most of the literature. Evolutionary models typically postulate that a given game is played by large populations of player types, each type always playing in the same role. Our model di¤ers from these evolutionary models in its focus on the behavior over time of individual players, rather than the average behavior of populations of player types.
In the next section we introduce the model and the better-reply dynamics. In Section 3 we show that …nite supermodular games and generic, continuous, twoplayer, quasi-concave games have the weak FIP. In Section 4 we add mistakes to the better reply dynamics by postulating that a player who samples and sees a payo¤ no better than the status quo payo¤ may make a mistake and switch. In this section we also introduce a modi…ed better-reply dynamics with mistakes in which more than one player may sample at the same time. We show that in these dynamics, as the sampling and mistake probabilities go to zero, play can only converge to states that belong to a recurrent class of the better-reply dynamics without mistakes, implying that they converge to a Nash equilibrium in …nite games with the weak FIP. This section also compares the better and the best-reply dynamics. In Section 5 we prove that in the better-reply dynamics with mistakes and simultaneous sampling play converges to the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium in common interest games, which include coordination games. 3 Section 6 contains concluding remarks. 3 Common interest games have a strategy pro…le whose associated payo¤ pro…le strictly dominates that of all other strategy pro…les.
The Model
We begin by describing the game structure and then introduce the better-reply dynamics. The stage game is g = hN; A; ¼i, where N = f1; : : : ; ng is the set of players, ¼ = (¼ 1 ; :::; ¼ n ) is the vector of the players' payo¤ functions, A = £ i2N A i is the set of action pro…les with typical element a, and A ¡i = £ j2N nfig A j . In most of the paper we restrict attention to …nite strategy spaces, so that A i = f1; :::; m i g.
However, in Section 3.3 A i is a compact interval on the real line. Throughout the paper certain notational conventions will be followed. Let X ½ R k , Y ½ X, and x; y 2 X. Then X ¡i = £ j6 =i X i with typical element x ¡i , xny i = (x ¡i ; y i ), and
The inequalities x¸y, x À y, and x > y mean, respectively, x i¸yi for all i, x i > y i for all i, and x¸y but x 6 = y.
Under the better-reply dynamics, at any time player i has a status quo action a i , which the player uses almost always. The status quo action pro…le is a = (a 1 ; :::; a n ) and the payo¤ player i associates with the status quo action pro…le is ¼ i (a). Occasionally, the player samples another action a E i 2 A i nfa i g. The sampled action becomes the new status quo if it provides a payo¤ higher than a i .
De…nition 1
Better-Reply Dynamics. At each time period, one player i 2 N is randomly selected with all players having the same selection probability; player i randomly samples action a E i 2 A i nfa i g with probability (m i ¡ 1)" divided equally among the elements of A i nfa i g and switches his status quo action to a
The better-reply dynamics generates a Markov process on the …nite state space A of action pro…les. Let p(a 0 ; a 00 ; ") be the transition probability from state a 0 to state 4 In de…ning player i's status quo payo¤ to be ¼ i (a), the better-reply dynamics does not keep track of the occasional observations of a di¤erent payo¤ when some other player is sampling while a is the status quo action. This is a shortcut that captures the intuition that each player i gets accustomed to seeing ¼ i (a) when a is the status quo action pro…le. Taking the long route of precisely formalizing the details of players' behavior is possible, but would require expanding the state space of the stochastic process beyond A. The resulting tedious formulation would not change our results. Indeed, the results in all sections except Section 5 are insensitive to the way that players revise the status quo payo¤. stochastic process is at any s 2 T , then it will leave T in a …nite number of steps and will never return to any state in T .
If A is the unique recurrent class of P ("), then the stochastic process is irreducible, otherwise it is reducible. For most games, the Markov chain P (") associated with the better-reply dynamics is reducible and the stochastic process is not ergodic; the recurrent class to which it will converge depends on history.
The Weak FIP and Convergence to Nash
This section is divided into three subsections. In Section 3.1 the weak …nite improvement property (weak FIP) is introduced and it is shown that the better reply dynamics must converge to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in any game having the weak FIP.
We then note that dominance solvable and potential games have the weak FIP. In Section 3.2 we prove that supermodular games are weakly acycylic which implies they have the weak FIP and in Section 3.3 we prove that generic, continuous, two-player, strictly quasi-concave games have the weak FIP. Thus, the better reply dynamics converges to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium dominance solvable games, potential games, supermodular games, and almost all two-player strictly quasi-concave games. 
The Weak FIP
(ii) The game g = hN; A; ¼i has the weak …nite improvement property (weak FIP) if from each action pro…le a 2 A there exists a …nite sequence of single-player improvements that ends in a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
The better-reply dynamics eventually converges to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in …nite games with the weak FIP. Which equilibrium is reached may depend on the initial state of the process; however, any of the pure strategy equilibria may be reached.
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Lemma 1 Let g = hN; A; ¼i be a …nite game that has the weak FIP. Then the recurrent classes of the Markov process generated by the better reply dynamics are all absorbing states, each of which is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of g. Every pure strategy Nash equilibrium of g is an aborbing state.
Proof. Let a 2 A be a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of g. Then there are no single player improvements from a; hence, a is an absorbing state. If a is not a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, then a cannot be an aborbing state; however, it remains to be seen whether a can belong to a (non-degenerate) recurrent class. If such a recurrent class 5 Theorem 5 in Section 4 guarantees that if a game has the weak FIP, then the limiting stationary distribution of the better-reply dynamics with mistakes (see De…nition 4) puts positive mass only on states a 2 A that are Nash equilibria. Not all Nash equilibria need to have positive mass. L C R T 3; 3 2; 2 2; 2 M 2; 2 1; ¡1 ¡1; 1 B 2; 2 ¡1; 1 1; ¡1 A …nite game g = hN; A; ¼i is dominance solvable if there is a unique strategy pro…le a ¤ 2 A that survives the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. 6 The surviving strategy pro…le a ¤ in a dominance solvable game is the unique Nash equilibrium of g. Clearly, …nite, dominance solvable games have the weak FIP.
The game g is an ordinal potential game if there is a function © :
for all i 2 N , a 2 A, and a i ; a 0 i 2 A i . In an ordinal potential game each player's payo¤ function is strategically equivalent to some common function ©. The game g is a potential game if © satis…es the stronger condition
A pure strategy a i 2 A i for player i is strictly dominated by another strategy
Monderer and Shapley [16] de…ned the …nite improvement property (FIP) and proved that any …nite ordinal potential game has the FIP. Table 1 
Supermodular Games
We prove below that supermodular games are quasi-acyclic. Quasi-acyclicity is, roughly speaking, the weak FIP with the restriction that one uses strictly payo¤-improving best replies rather than better replies. Any quasi-acyclic game then must have the weak FIP. As a result, the better reply dynamics must lead to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in supermodular games. We begin by de…ning the appropriate best reply concept and weak acyclicity.
In a game g = hN; A; ¼i, the state anx i 2 A is a weak best reply to a if and only if there exists i 2 N and x i 2 A i such that ¼ i (anx i )¸¼ i (any i ) for all y i 2 A i . The state anx i 2 A is a strict best reply to a if and only if it is a weak best reply and 7 Voorneveld and Norde [23] proved that …nite, ordinal potential games are characterized by the absence of weak improvement cycles. A weak improvement cycle is a sequence of strategy pro…les (a 1 ; :::; a v+1 ) such that (i) a 1 = a v+1 ; (ii) for all`2 f1; :::; vg, a`+ 1 and a`only di¤er in the strategy of player i`; that is, a`
L C R T 7; 0 3; 3 0; 7 M 3; 3 5; 5 3; 3 B 0; 7 3; 3 7; 0 
De…nition 3 The game g = hN; A; ¼i is quasi-acyclic if, from all action pro…les a 2 A, there exists a …nite sequence of strict best replies that ends in a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Acyclic games were introduced by Young [25] who required that any sequence of weak best replies end in a pure Nash equilibrium after a …nite number of steps.
Quasi-acyclic games are identical to Milchtaich's [13] weakly acyclic games, except that Milchtaich uses weak best replies. Quasi-acyclic games have the weak FIP, but the converse is not true. The game in Table 2 has the weak FIP, but satis…es none of the acyclicity de…nitions. There is no best-reply sequence starting at (T; L) and ending at the unique Nash equilibrium (M; C); however, f(T; L); (T; C); (M; C)g is a sequence of single-player improvements. Thus, the set of games with the FIP is a subset of the set of quasi-acyclic games which, in turn, is a subset of the set of games with the weak FIP.
A …nite game g = hN; A; ¼i is supermodular if it is possible to order the strategies of each player so that, for any a; a 0 2 A such that a¸a
. Players' strategies exhibit strategic complementarities in supermodular games;
the marginal payo¤ to an increase in a player's strategy is an increasing function of each of the other players' strategies. Lemma 2 establishes that all …nite, two-player, supermodular games have the weak FIP and Theorem 3 extends this result to nplayers. In both results the proof is carried out by showing that supermodular games are quasi-acyclic.
a i g be the set of strategies of player i that are less than or equal to a i and A(a) = £ i2N A i (a i ). Let a 0 = (m 1 ; :::; m n ) be the strategy pro…le corresponding to the highest strategy for each player and 1 n = (1; :::; 1) be the n-vector whose elements are all equal to one. For any game g = hN; A; ¼i, any nonempty subset of players C ½ N , and action pro…le a 2 A, de…ne the restricted
In game g(C; a), C is the set of active players, j 2 C has strategy set A j (a j ), and, for any given pro…le of actions
To simplify notation when C = N we will write g(a) instead of g(N; a). Finally, let b i (a) be player i's highest best reply to the strategy pro…le a.
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There are two elements behind the proof of Lemma 2. The …rst is that in a two-player, supermodular game g, one can start a process of iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies beginning from a 0 = (m 1 ; m 2 ), the pro…le with both players using their highest strategy. This process peels o¤ strategies a i > a
Repeating the process in the game where players are restricted to strategies that are strictly less than the strategies in a 1 ¤ leads to a Nash equilibrium a 2 ¤ of the restricted game, and so on. A similar process can be started from (1; 1), the pro…le with both players using their smallest strategy. The second element consists of showing that, for all h = 1; 2; : : : and i = 1; 2, there is a …nite sequence of best replies that starts from any pro…le in which player i uses a
and ends at a Nash equilibrium of the unrestricted game g.
Lemma 2
Any …nite, two-player, supermodular game g = hf1; 2g; A; ¼i is quasiacyclic, and thus has the weak FIP.
Proof. Starting at a 0 , the highest strategy pro…le in A, iteratively eliminate strictly dominated strategies as follows. De…ne the sequence
More precisely, if B i (a) is the best reply correspondence of player i, then b i (a) is the selection of B i given by the largest element of the set B i (a).
h¸1 and note that a h¡1 i¸a h i for all i. Then for any a i > a
The …rst inequality in equation (1) follows from a h i being the highest best reply to a h¡1 ; the second follows from a h¡1 i¸a 0 i for all i and the supermodularity of g. Equation (1) Continue this process, going from g(a h¡1 ) to g(a h ), until there are no more strictly dominated strategies to remove by this means. Since the sequence (a 0 ; a 1 ; :::) is decreasing and bounded, it must converge and the limit must be a Nash equilibrium
De…ne the two faces of A(a
j g for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j. We have shown that, for any pro…le a 2 AnA(a
is a …nite sequence of strict best replies leading to a pro…le in
If (a i ; a
is a strict best reply to (a i ; a
This shows that, given any a = 2 A(a 1 ¤ ¡ 1 2 ), there exists a …nite sequence of strict best replies leading either to a Nash equilibrium of g in AnA(a
Using an analogous argument, a process of elimination of dominated strategies can also be started at (1; 1). This process converges to a Nash equilibrium a
, there exists a …nite sequence of strict best replies leading either to 9 Recall that A(a
) must be possible, because there is no improvement to somewhere in either face, the point is not a Nash equilibrium, implying improvement is possible in some direction, and the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies ensures that improvement in AnA(a
a Nash equilibrium of g in e A(a K ¤ ) or to a strategy pro…le in e A(a
Now consider the restricted game g(a 1 ¤ ¡ 1 2 ) and, as in the original game g, proceed by eliminating strictly dominated strategies to arrive at a Nash equilibrium
, there exists a …nite sequence of strict best replies leading either to a strategy pro…le in A(a
or to a Nash equilibrium a
is not a Nash equilibrium of the unrestricted game g. Then for some i, ¼ i (a
is a Nash equilibrium of g, because otherwise there would exist a i < a
which is not compatible with a ¤ being a Nash equilibrium of g(a 1 ¤ ¡ 1 2 ). Thus, there is a …nite sequence of strict best replies from a ¤ to a Nash equilibrium of g.
We have shown that, for any a 2 AnA(a 2 ¤ ¡ 1 2 ), there exists a …nite sequence of strict best replies leading either to a Nash equilibrium of g in AnA(a
. Repeated application of the same argument shows that from any a 2 A there is a …nite sequence of strict best replies leading to either a Nash equilibrium of g or to a strategy pro…le in A(a
, we know already that from any pro…le in A(a
is a …nite sequence of strict best replies to either a Nash equilibrium of g or to a strategy pro…le in e A(a
Thus, any two-player supermodular game is quasi-acyclic.
The proof that an n-player supermodular game is quasi-acyclic also has two elements. The …rst, iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies, is essentially the same as in Lemma 2. The second element of the proof uses induction on n.
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Recall that ¼ i (a
Theorem 3 Any …nite, supermodular game g = hN; A; ¼i is quasi-acyclic, and thus has the weak FIP.
Proof. Suppose that (n ¡ 1)-player, …nite, supermodular games are quasi-acyclic.
De…ne the face F N nfig (a) = fa 0 2 A : a 0 a and a 0 i = a i g. As in the proof of Lemma 2, let a h = (b 1 (a h¡1 ); :::; b n (a h¡1 )) for h¸1 and, starting from a 0 , proceed by iteratively eliminating strictly dominated strategies. The sequence (a 0 ; a 1 ; :::) is decreasing and bounded and must converge to a Nash equilibrium a 1 ¤ . Thus, for any pro…le a = 2 A(a 1 ¤ ), there is a sequence of strict best replies leading either to a 1 ¤ or to some face F N nfig (a 1 ¤ ). We now prove the stronger claim that, given any
there exists a …nite sequence of strict best replies leading either to a Nash equilibrium of g in AnA(a
Therefore, from any point in
there is a sequence of strict best replies leading to a Nash equilibrium a
Either a i 1 is a Nash equilibrium of g, or there is a strategy a i 1 < a
). In the latter case, either
and then there is a …nite sequence of strict best replies leading to a Nash equilibrium a i 2 of g(N nfi 2 g; a 1 ¤ ).
Again, if a i 2 is not a Nash equilibrium of the game g, then there is a strict best reply improvement from a i 2 either to A(a 1 ¤ ¡ 1 n ), or to a face F N nfi 3 g (a 1 ¤ ) and from there to a Nash equilibrium a i 3 of g(N nfi 3 g; a 1 ¤ ). Repeating this argument generates a sequence of strict best replies that either ends in A(a )na j be the …rst element in the sequence going
which is a contradiction; hence a j < a ). Similar reasoning applies to all the other steps in the sequence of strict best replies from
. This concludes the proof that, given any a = 2 A(a 1 ¤ ¡ 1 n ), there exists a …nite sequence of strict best replies leading either to a Nash equilibrium of g in AnA(a
In the restricted game g(a 1 ¤ ¡ 1 n ), iteratively eliminate strictly dominated strategies until a Nash equilibrium a 2 ¤ of g(a 1 ¤ ¡ 1 n ) is reached. As before, given any
there exists a …nite sequence of strict best replies lead-
is not a Nash equilibrium of the unrestricted game g, then for some i,
In this last case, (a ¤ na i )na j be the …rst step in the sequence going from (a ¤ na
which is a contradiction; hence a j > a To see that a ¤¤ is a Nash equilibrium of g, suppose the contrary. Then player i would pro…t by deviating to some strategy a i < a
which is a contradiction. The …rst inequality follows from (a ¤¤ na i ) being an improvement over a ¤¤ , the second from a
, and supermodularity, the
, and the fourth from a i < a
Thus we have proven that, given any a 2 AnA(a 2 ¤ ¡ 1 n ), there exists a …nite sequence of strict best replies leading either to a Nash equilibrium of g belonging to
Repeated application of this construction shows that given any non-equilibrium a 2 A, there is a …nite sequence of strict best replies from a to a Nash equilibrium a ¤ of g. This concludes the proof that all …nite, supermodular games are quasi-acyclic.
Theorem 3 is related to results obtained by Vives [22] and Milgrom and Roberts [14] . Vives studied Cournot tatonnement, in which at any discrete point in time each player switches to a strategy that is a best reply to the past strategy pro…le.
He showed that in supermodular games Cournot tatonnement converges monotonically to a Nash equilibrium if the starting point is below or above all the best reply correspondences of the players. Vives also showed that supermodular games have a greatest and a smallest Nash equilibrium. Milgrom and Roberts [14] showed that the process of iterative elimination of dominated strategies eliminates all strategies that are either greater than those associated with the greatest Nash equilibrium, or smaller than those associated with the smallest Nash equilibrium.
Quasi-Concave Games
We now examine two-player games g = hf1; 2g; A; ¼i where each player i has a one dimensional, compact, convex strategy set A i ½ R, and a payo¤ function ¼ i that is continuous in a 2 A and strictly quasi-concave with respect to a i 2 A i . Let B : A ! A, with B(a) = (B 1 (a 2 ); B 2 (a 1 )) denote the best-reply correspondence of the game g. Strict quasi-concavity of ¼ i implies that: (i) B i is continuous and single-valued and (ii) player i's payo¤ declines as a i moves away from B i (a ¡i ). We also assume that the best reply functions are transversal; that is, at any Nash equilibrium they must cross and they must not be tangent. The set of Nash equilibria of such a generic quasi-concave game g is a …nite, nonempty set A N E = fa 1 ; :::; a q g ½ A.
We now show that generic, two-player, quasi-concave games have the weak FIP.
The intuition for this result is the following. Start from any strategy pro…le a
is not a best reply for some player i. Then the players alternate moves, starting with player i, with each move being a single-player improvement. This continues until one player moves to a point from which the other player can move to a Nash equilibrium. This process can be forced to occur in a …nite number of steps.
Theorem 4 Any generic, two-player, quasi-concave game g = hf1; 2g; A; ¼i has the weak FIP.
Proof. The proof proceeds in two parts. In the …rst part it is shown that a …nite number of steps is su¢cient to move the two players using only single-player improvements from an arbitrary starting point either to a Nash equilibrium or to a ball of radius r > 0 around a Nash equilibrium. In the second part it is shown that it is possible to move the two players using only single-player improvements from an arbitrary starting point in the ball to the Nash equilibrium in the ball.
Part (i).
First the strategy space is divided in two separate ways. One way utilizes the Nash equilibria to construct rectangles in A; the other divides A according to directions of single-player improvement. Each rectangle is closed with a non-empty interior. Two rectangles may share, at most, a side or a vertex, and no rectangle has a Nash equilibrium in its interior. To construct them, draw lines in R 2 parallel to each axis from all Nash equilibrium points in A N E = (a 1 ; :::; a q ). That is, draw lines
Rg for all h = 1; : : : ; q. This divides A into compact rectangles having disjoint interiors.
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A rectangle is 11 If all q Nash equilibria are interior to A and the coordinates of all equilibria are distinct, there will be (q + 1) external if it intersects the boundary of A and a side of a rectangle that lies in the boundary of A is called an external side; all other sides are called internal sides. From each internal side of a rectangle, it is possible to move to a Nash equilibrium of g via a single-player improvement. Thus, for g not to have the weak FIP there must be at least one point of some rectangle from which it is impossible to reach an internal side through a …nite sequence of single-player improvements.
The strategy space A contains four sets, called strict improvement regions, (+¡), (¡+), (++), (¡¡), according to the direction of improvement for each player. For example, at a point a = (a 1 ; a 2 ) in (+; ¡) player 1's best-reply to a is greater than a 1 (hence, by quasi-concavity, his payo¤ increases if he unilaterally increases his action), while player 2's best-reply to a is smaller than a 2 (his payo¤ increases if he unilaterally decreases his action). If a 1 is the best reply of player 1 to a, then a is in the common boundary of (+¡) and (¡¡) which is part of the graph of B 2 ) must remain in the relative interior of the rectangle, otherwise either it would reach a Nash equilibrium or an internal side from which one step would lead to a Nash equilibrium. 12 Now consider the best reply of player 2 to a ) must remain in the relative interior of the rectangle, reach a Nash equilibrium, or reach an internal side. Only the …rst of these three possibilities is compatible with never reaching a Nash equilibrium. Continue to …nd successive best replies by the two players, a h = (a
Recall the relative interior of a rectangle includes any external side of that rectangle.
and so forth. All line segments joining these best-reply moves must remain within the relative interior of the rectangle Z. This in…nite sequence must either (1) occur if there were a Nash equilibrium in the interior of the rectangle Z. However, by de…nition of the rectangles, there are no Nash equilibria in the interior of a rectangle. 13 Thus, (1) is impossible. In case (2), the sequence of movements from best reply to best reply is monotone, since it stays within the same region of A, and hence it must reach the interior of a ball of radius r around a Nash equilibrium in a …nite number of steps. This concludes the proof of part (i). The impossibility of (2) is taken up in part (ii) of the proof. and B 2 (a 1 ) '¯2a 1 , with¯1;¯2 > 0. Transversality of the best reply functions guarantees that their linear approximations have di¤erent slopes, so that¯1¯2 < 1.
Part (ii). Suppose the ball of radius r is reached at the point a

13
Note that no Nash equilibrium on the boundary of A can be in the relative interior of the rectangle X, because all such equilibria also lie on an interior boundary of some rectangle. The path to the Nash equilibrium will be by alternate moves, starting with player 2. Each move will be to a point where the payo¤ of the moving player is almost unchanged (as opposed to being a best reply). Note that the vertical distance between the best reply functions at some …xed value of a 1 is a 1 =¯1 ¡¯2a 1 and the distance from the horizontal axis to the lower best reply function is¯2a 1 . The ratio of the latter to the former is¯1¯2=(1 ¡¯1¯2) which is obviously independent of the choice of a 1 (within the ball). The corresponding ratio for the vertical axis is exactly the same.
At the …rst move, player 2 goes from a Figure 1 ) with a 1 2 chosen so that the payo¤ of player 2 is only marginally increased. The distance from C to D is almost the same as that from A to C due to the near-symmetry of the isopro…t curves of the players. Player 1 now moves from (a 2 ), chosen so that the pro…t of player 2 rises slightly and IJ is more than 3 times the size of HI. At the kth move, the new point is at a distance from the nearer best reply function that is at least k times the distance between the best reply functions.
Denote this ratio y k . After a …nite number of moves, y k+1 >¯1¯2=(1 ¡¯1¯2) > y k which means that the k + 1 move can be chosen to lay either below the horizontal axis or to the left of the vertical axis (illustrated in Figure 1 ) as the move from K to L. For this move, choose instead the point on the axis. From there it is one step to the Nash equilibrium, which completes the proof. . The unique Nash equilibrium of g is (1; 1) . The game g has the weak FIP, but it does not have the FIP and it is not quasi-acyclic. To see this, note that the best reply functions are: B 1 (a 2 ) = 2 ¡ a 2 and B 2 (a 1 ) = a 1 . Hence there is a cycle of best-reply improvements involving the strategy pro…les (0; 0), (2; 0), (2; 2), (0; 2). Table 3 displays an approximation of this game in which each player's strategy set is f0; 1; 2g. The weak FIP is satis…ed, because it is possible to make a single-player improvement from (0; 0) to (1; 0) and then from (1; 0) to (1; 1).
Not all …nite approximations of a generic, two-player, quasi-concave game g need to have the weak FIP. However, the weak FIP will typically hold for approximations of g that have the property that all the strategies corresponding to a Nash equilibrium in the continuous game are present in the …nite approximation. For example, the is the set of Nash equilibria of g. Table 3 shows that many other approximations will also work. For such approximations of generic, two-player, quasi-concave games the only recurrent classes of the better-reply dynamics are the pure strategy Nash equilibria.
Ergodic Variants of the Better-Reply Dynamics
We …rst introduce two variants of the better-reply dynamics: the better-reply dynamics with mistakes and the better-reply dynamics with mistakes and simultaneous sampling. The advantage of these two variants is that the Markov process they generate is ergodic. By introducing the possibility that players make mistakes when deciding whether to change status quo action, we obtain the following variant of the better-reply dynamics.
De…nition 4 Better-Reply Dynamics with Mistakes. This dynamics is like
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The better-reply dynamics with mistakes and simultaneous sampling will be used in Section 5.
that of De…nition 1 except that when
In the next variant of the better-reply dynamics we allow sampling by more than one player at the same time. However, for small ", the probability of simultaneous sampling of a new action by exactly k players is k orders of magnitude less likely than the probability that only a single player samples a new action. Let K ½ N be the set of players actually sampling in a time period, and let a E K = fa E i g i2K be the strategies they sample, with a E i 6 = a i for all i 2 K.
De…nition 5 Better-Reply Dynamics with Mistakes and Simultaneous
Sampling. At any time period each player j 2 N randomly samples an action with probability (m j ¡ 1)" divided equally among the elements of A j nfa j g. Player i 2 K switches his status quo action to a E i with probability one if
for some integer L > n. 15 We now need to introduce a few additional notions from the theory of stochastic processes. The resistance between any two states a 0 , a 00 2 A, denoted r(a 0 ; a 00 ) 2
, is the extended real number given by r(a 0 ; a 00 ) = lim "!0 log p(a 0 ; a 00 ; ")= log ", with r(a 0 ; a 00 ) = 1 if p(a 0 ; a 00 ; ") = 0 for " 2 [0; " ¤ ]. Intuitively, if h players sample and mistakes by`players are required for a transition from a 0 to a 00 under the better-reply dynamics with mistakes and simultaneous sampling, then r(a 0 ; a 00 ) = h +`L.
A tree rooted at a, T (a), is a set of ordered pairs of (or edges between) elements of A, such that starting from each element a 0 2 Ana there is a unique edge beginning at a 0 and a unique path (or sequence of edges) leading to a. The resistance of a tree rooted at a, r(T (a)), is the sum of the resistances of the edges that compose it, r(T (a)) = P (a 0 ;a 00 )2T (a) r(a 0 ; a 00 ). The stochastic potential Ã(a) of a state a 2 A is 15 Note that the upper bound on the mistake probability is lower with simultaneous than with isolated sampling. This bound guarantees that the probability of a single mistake " L is less than the probability that all players sample a new action, " n ¦ i2N (m i ¡ 1).
the minimum resistance over all trees rooted at a. Let ®(a) be the number of trees rooted at a that have minimum resistance.
For any game, the Markov process P (") associated with the dynamics in either De…nition 4 or De…nition 5 is aperiodic and irreducible for all " > 0; hence it has a unique stationary distribution ¹(") satisfying ¹(")P (") = ¹("). The stationary distribution ¹(") gives the long-run frequency with which each state will be observed.
Let P (0) be the stochastic process when " = 0. Results due to Freidlin and Wentzell 
Cycles
The game in Table 4 has a strict Nash equilibrium, (M; C), and a mixed equilib- Table 4 : Strict Nash Equilibrium with Zero Mass that the stochastic process cannot generally converge to a mixed strategy equilibrium, because the exact probabilities in a mixed strategy equilibrium depend on cardinal properties that are generally altered by order-preserving transformations. For example, in any 2 £ 2 game with a unique, completely mixed Nash equilibrium, the stationary distributions of the dynamics in De…nitions 4 and 5 put equal mass on each of the four pure strategy pro…les. 16 
Limit Distributions
The following is a simple, general result about convergence of the better-reply dynamics with mistakes and the better-reply dynamics with mistakes and simultaneous sampling.
Theorem 5 Let g = hN; A; ¼i be a …nite game. As " ! 0, the limiting stationary distribution of the dynamics in De…nitions 4 and 5 put positive mass on state a only if a belongs to a recurrent class E of the better-reply dynamics. If a 2 E has positive mass, then all states in E have positive mass.
Proof. To prove that the limiting stationary distribution puts zero mass on any state a that does not belong to a recurrent class of the better-reply dynamics, it su¢ces to show that, if T (a) is any minimum resistance tree with root a, then there exists some state b 2 A and a tree T (b) with root b whose resistance is smaller than that of T (a). 16 However, it is not true that the stationary distribution always puts equal mass on all states associated with a mixed strategy equilibrium when that equilibrium is unique. See Table 6 for an example.
Consider such a state a and tree T (a). Proof. If a alone has positive mass, then the recurrent class to which it belongs must be a singleton. This implies that a is a state from which no player can make a single-player improvement; that is, a is a Nash equilibrium.
The Better-Reply Correspondence
Given a …nite game g = hN; A; ¼i, and any X i ½ A i , i 2 N , with X = £ i2N X i , let ¢ i (X i ) be the set of player i's mixed strategies with support in X i and let
The better-reply correspondence°: ¢(A) ! A is the correspondence that maps each pro…le of mixed strategies into the sets of better-replies by each player. 17 Ritzberger and Weibull [17] de…ned a set X = £ i2N X i as being closed under the better-reply correspondence if°(¢(X)) ½ X. There are analogies, but also important di¤erences, between sets that are closed under the better-reply correspondence and the recurrent classes of our better-reply dynamics.
Ritzberger and Weibull [17, Theorem 1] showed that for a large class of deterministic, continuous time, population dynamics a set ¢(X) is asymptotically stable 17 More precisely,°:
if and only if X is a set closed under the better-reply correspondence. Similarly, the better-reply dynamics eventually converges to one of its recurrent classes.
Ritzberger and Weibull [17, Proposition 4] also proved that if a set X is closed under the better-reply correspondence, then ¢(X) contains a connected component of Nash equilibria. To the contrary, recurrent classes of the better-reply dynamics need not contain the support of any Nash equilibrium. In the game in Table 5 This game has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium; the set of mixed strategy Nash equilibria is ((:5; 0; 0; :5); (p; q; 1 ¡ p ¡ q)), where q = (3 + 4p)=13
and 16=659 p 497=971.
Best Reply Dynamics
We now discuss the di¤erence between better-reply and best-reply dynamics with and without mistakes.
De…nition 6 Best-Reply Dynamics. At the beginning of each time period, a player is randomly selected; with probability " the selected player switches to a best reply to the current state a and with probability 1 ¡ " he continues playing the status quo action.
De…nition 7
Best-Reply Dynamics with Mistakes. This dynamics is like Definition 6, except that the selected player may make a mistake, in which case he changes his status quo to some action at random. The probability of making a mistake, ½,
The game in Table 6 has a unique equilibrium ((:5; 0; :5); (:5; 0; :5)). The unique recurrent class of the better-reply dynamics consists not only of the four corners 18 Note that E is not a product set. The de…nition of closed under the better-reply correspondence only applies to product sets. Table 3 , the best-reply dynamics has two recurrent classes f(1; 1)g and f(0; 0); (2; 0); (2; 2); (0; 2)g and the limiting distribution of the best-reply dynamics with mistakes puts positive mass on all states belonging to one of these classes. The game, however, has the weak FIP and f(1; 1)g is the only recurrent class of the better-reply dynamics. 19 Hence in games that do not have the weak FIP our players' learning algorithm may not be "adaptive" in the sense of Milgrom and Roberts [15] . 20 Dekel and Scotchmer ( [3] ) presented an example of a game in which the discrete replicator dynamics need not eliminate a pure strategy that is strictly dominated by a mixed strategy. Their example can be interpreted as another illustration of the fact that better-reply and best-reply dynamics di¤er.
Common Interest and Coordination Games
In this section we study common interest and coordination games. 21 The key result is that in such games the limiting distribution of the better-reply dynamics with mistakes and simultaneous sampling puts all mass on a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium.
De…nition 8
The game g = hN; A; ¼i is a common interest game if there is a Pareto dominant strategy pro…le a ¤ 2 A (i.e., a Two features of our model are crucial to obtain convergence to the Pareto dominant equilibrium. First, contrary to models that study the evolution of the average behavior in large populations of players, our players do not play best replies to some empirical distribution of past play. Instead, they follow a naive stimulus-response behavior; they have an habitual action that they play and only change it after experiencing a higher payo¤ from sampling a new action. Second, it must be possible for several players to sample at the same time. The probability of simultaneous sampling by a group of players must be a decreasing function of the group size, and it must always be larger than the probability of a mistake by a single player. Theorem 7 does 21 Our de…nition of common interest games is essentially the same used by Aumann and Sorin [1] . Young [25] uses the term to refer to games in which players' preferences over strategy pro…les coincide. Such games are quasi-acyclic and thus also have the weak FIP. However, common interest games as we de…ne them need not have the weak FIP. not extend to the better-reply dynamics with mistakes of De…nition 4 that only allows isolated sampling. For example, in the games in Table 7 the limiting distribution of the better-reply dynamics with mistakes puts positive probability on all the Nash equilibria.
One may object that when simultaneous sampling occurs, a player should contemplate the possibility that the other players may not adopt their sampled actions in the future. A rational player, then, should attach less signi…cance to his payo¤ when sampling together with other players. Our reply to this objection is that our players are not very rational at all. They need not know that others are sampling at the same time that they are, and they need not know others' payo¤ functions and available options. However, all coordination games are of common interest; therefore, Theorem 7
implies that the limiting distribution of the better-reply dynamics with mistakes and simultaneous sampling puts all mass on the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium. In the left coordination game in Table 7 , all mass goes to the Pareto optimal equilibrium, Play does not converge to the strategy pro…le with the highest potential. Both risk dominance and potential functions depend on the cardinal properties of a game.
As noted before, in our setup cardinal properties play no role, all choices made by our players depend upon strictly ordinal properties of the payo¤ functions. The right coordination game in Table 7 is due to Young, who showed that the limiting distribution of his stochastic process puts all mass on (M; C). In the better-reply dynamics with mistakes and simultaneous sampling play converges to (B; R), which is both the risk dominant and the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium.
In Young [25] and KMR [11] , at each point in time players are selected to play a given game from large populations of player types. When selected a player observes a sample of past play and uses the empirical frequencies in this sample as his beliefs about current players' choices. The player then chooses a best reply to these beliefs.
They obtained convergence to the risk dominant equilibrium in 2 £ 2 coordination games. Robson and Vega-Redondo [18] studied a similar evolutionary model, but assumed that players tend to imitate the most successful strategy. More precisely, the number of players in a population using the strategy that realizes the highest average payo¤ among the active strategies has a strictly positive probability of increasing and cannot decrease. They showed convergence to the Pareto optimal equilibrium in two-player common interest games.
Turning to diagonal dominating, partial coordination games, we have: The converse of Theorem 8 is false; Table 8 is a diagonal dominating, partial coordination game in which a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium has zero mass in the limiting stationary distribution of the better-reply dynamics with mistakes and simultaneous sampling. The limiting distribution puts all mass on (M; C; M); no mass goes to the two Nash equilibria (T; L; W ) and (B; R; E).
Theorem 8 does not generalize to common ranking, partial coordination games. Table 9 
Conclusions
We have modeled players having very stringent bounds on their information, memory, and computational ability, and who are both less well informed and less rational than are players in most of the literature on learning, evolutionary games, and bounded rationality. These players follow a very naive gradient behavior. They know what payo¤ they are typically getting from their "usual" (i.e., status quo) action, they occasionally, randomly sample something else, and they switch when they sample something having a higher payo¤ than they have been getting. Such players are arguably quite common, due either to inherent limitations on information and the computational complexity of a game, or because they are simultaneously engaged in many games and, having limited intellectual resources, must give short shrift to some games.
In games with su¢cient regularity in the payo¤ functions, such as …nite games with the weak FIP, our players' behavior converges to a Nash equilibrium. We have show that supermodular and continuous, two-player, quasi-concave games have the weak FIP. In the absence of these regularities in the payo¤ functions, Nash equilibrium behavior need not result.
It is possible to show that in an environment where the players' payo¤ functions randomly change from time to time (i.e., regime shifts), but the probability of a regime change is very small compared to the probability of sampling unused actions, all of our results remain valid. Thus, for example, if all regimes are games with the weak FIP, then the better-reply dynamics will converge to a Nash equilibrium in each given regime. Given the uncertainties of real life and the knowledge that real life games change character in unexpected ways from time to time, this …nding provides a rationale for the common sense view that one should occasionally randomly check alternatives that do not appear, on the surface, to be attractive; for a regime shift may have occurred without the player noticing and, as a result, some previously unattractive action may have become very pro…table.
